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Satchu's Rich Wrap-Up
 
 
Friday 28th of August 2020
 










Manias feel better and better as you go faster and faster. And then in one final frenzy it is over. @DavidBCollum
Misc.

The damage done in that last fateful blowoff, a lot of damage can be done that drags out over decades. Keep trying to think of a metaphor.

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The Desert Army⁣ This is what Amboseli has to offer and when it does, I think it is unrivalled as a spectacle in the natural world.
Africa

A battalion of elephants in one seamless, cohesive unit charging through the desert. To see this scene played out is a real privilege.

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Remarkable report by @BuzzFeed On the prison camp complex built by China in Xinjiang: 260 structures built since 2017 and bearing the hallmarks of fortified detention compounds H/T @@adam_tooze
Law & Politics


China has secretly built scores of massive new prison and internment camps in the past three years, dramatically escalating its campaign against Muslim minorities even as it publicly claimed the detainees had all been set free. 

The construction of these purpose-built, high-security camps — some capable of housing tens of thousands of people — signals a radical shift away from the country’s previous makeshift use of public buildings, like schools and retirement homes, to a vast and permanent infrastructure for mass detention.

In the most extensive investigation of China’s internment camp system ever done using publicly available satellite images, coupled with dozens of interviews with former detainees, BuzzFeed News identified more than 260 structures built since 2017 and bearing the hallmarks of fortified detention compounds. There is at least one in nearly every county in the far-west region of Xinjiang. During that time, the investigation shows, China has established a sprawling system to detain and incarcerate hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities, in what is already the largest-scale detention of ethnic and religious minorities since World War II.

These forbidding facilities — including several built or significantly expanded within the last year — are part of the government’s unprecedented campaign of mass detention of more than a million people, which began in late 2016. That year Chen Quanguo, the region’s top official and Communist Party boss, whom the US recently sanctioned over human rights abuses, also put Muslim minorities — more than half the region’s population of about 25 million — under perpetual surveillance via facial recognition cameras, cellphone tracking, checkpoints, and heavy-handed human policing. They are also subject to many other abuses, ranging from sterilization to forced labor.

To detain thousands of people in short order, the government repurposed old schools and other buildings. Then, as the number of detainees swelled, in 2018 the government began building new facilities with far greater security measures and more permanent architectural features, such as heavy concrete walls and guard towers, the BuzzFeed News analysis shows. Prisons often take years to build, but some of these new compounds took less than six months, according to historical satellite data. The government has also added more factories within camp and prison compounds during that time, suggesting the expansion of forced labor within the region. Construction was still ongoing as of this month.

“People are living in horror in these places,” said 49-year-old Zhenishan Berdibek, who was detained in a camp in the Tacheng region for much of 2018.

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5-MAR-2018 :: China has unveiled a Digital Panopticon in Xinjiang
Law & Politics

China has unveiled a Digital Panopticon in Xinjiang where a combination of data from video surveillance, face and license plate recognition, mobile device locations, and official records to identify targets for detention. 

Xinjiang is surely a precursor for how the CCCP will manage dissent. 

The actions in Xinjiang are part of the regional authorities’ ongoing “strike-hard” campaign, and of Xi’s “stability maintenance” and “enduring peace” drive in the region. 

Authorities say the campaign targets “terrorist elements,” but it is in practice far broader, and encompasses anyone suspected of political disloyalty.

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Failure by @WHO team to visit Wuhan sparks concerns over virus probe @FT
Misc.


A team from the World Health Organization tasked with investigating the origins of coronavirus did not visit Wuhan, fuelling concern from western governments over Beijing’s commitment to identifying the source of the pandemic.

A recently concluded three-week trip to China by the two-person WHO team did not entail a visit to Wuhan, the central Chinese city where the first cases of novel coronavirus were detected in December 2019, the UN agency has confirmed.

The WHO said the team was merely laying the groundwork in advance of a full international mission to investigate the virus but it was also vague on whether this larger task force would visit Wuhan.

“The WHO delegation sat in Beijing for three weeks and got nowhere near Wuhan,” a senior US official told the Financial Times. “Any chance of finding a smoking gun is now gone.”

Dave Sharma, an Australian government MP, said: “The international community is right to have serious concerns about the rigour and independence of the WHO’s early response to this pandemic, and its seeming wish to avoid offending China.

“If this allegation is proven, it is another disturbing incident of the WHO — which is charged with safeguarding global public health — putting the political sensitivities of a member state above the public health interests of the world, in the critical early stages of this pandemic. We are all now bearing the immense costs of such a policy.”

After initially bristling at calls from Australia, the US and other countries for a probe into the outbreak, which has claimed more than 800,000 lives, Chinese president Xi Jinping in May endorsed a WHO-led inquiry.

But the WHO resolution “to identify the zoonotic source of the virus and the route of introduction to the human population” — which was backed by more than 130 countries — has been dogged by concerns over transparency and access.

Mike Pompeo, the US secretary of state, said in July he believed the results of the inquiry would be “completely whitewashed”. 

In May, President Donald Trump terminated US ties with the WHO, which he said was under the “total control” of Beijing.

China’s foreign ministry said on Wednesday that concerns over the credibility of the inquiry were “totally unjustified”.

The ministry said China had acted responsibly by inviting a WHO team to the country while it was still in a “critical period” of preventing a resurgence of the virus. 

“We hope all relevant countries . . . can be like China to adopt a positive attitude and work together with the WHO,” it added.

Last week, the UN agency said: “A two-person WHO team has recently concluded its three-week assignment in China to lay the groundwork for an investigation into the source of the virus. This was in advance of the full mission, therefore, there are no ‘results of the WHO’s recent mission’ to share.”

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I am convinced that the only ‘’zoonotic’’ origin was one that was accelerated in the Laboratory #COVID19
Misc.

It is impossible to ignore the introduction of a PRRA insert between S1 and S2: it sticks out like a splinter. This insert creates the furin cleavage site

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Currency Markets at a Glance WSJ
World Currencies


Euro 1.1911

Dollar Index 92.30

Japan Yen 105.59

Swiss Franc 0.9029

Pound 1.3289

Aussie 0.7316

India Rupee 73.317

South Korea Won 1182.60

Brazil Real 5.569

Egypt Pound 15.8698

South Africa Rand 16.823

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India (DD=26/08/2020) A New High. Pandemic at a critical point. R(0)=3.71; R(T)=1.04>1; @CovidTrajectory
Emerging Markets


TC=3307099; (NC^=75995); NC(1)=81; NC(T)=75995; E(NC(T+1))=67999 (50%CI: 63230-72768)

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They fancied themselves free, wrote Camus, ―and no one will ever be free so long as there are pestilences. #COVID19
Misc.

―In this respect, our townsfolk were like everybody else, wrapped up in themselves; in other words, they were humanists: they disbelieved in pestilences.

A pestilence isn't a thing made to man's measure; therefore we tell ourselves that pestilence is a mere bogy of the mind, a bad dream that will pass away.

But it doesn't always pass away and, from one bad dream to another, it is men who pass away

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One of Ethiopia's main coronavirus centres 'nearly full' @BBCNews
Africa

One of Ethiopia's biggest coronavirus treatment facilities has told its patients it is nearly full and may not be able to accommodate new patients.

The Millennium Hall's medical director Dr Wuletaw Chanie told the BBC the facility’s intensive care unit (ICU) had reached its capacity while the semi-ICU is also almost full.

Dr Chanie said the hall, a concert venue which has been transformed into a centre for treating coronavirus patients, would probably exceed its admission capacity within a week and could no longer accommodate new patients who need intensive care and high-flow oxygen.

The centre receives around 20 patients per day and is currently treating more than 200.

More than half are receiving supplementary oxygen.

Ethiopia has seen a significant increase in Covid-19 cases recently, with around 25,000 cases in August alone.

According to the Ministry of Health, Ethiopia has reported more than 42,000 coronavirus cases, with most cases in the capital Addis Ababa.

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South Africa #COVID19 UPDATE 27 AUG @rid1tweets
Africa


• 2,585 new cases. Daily doubling rate = 165 days

• 19,009 tests conducted. Daily % test positivity = 13.6%

• 126 more deaths

• 6,096 additional recoveries today

• Active cases = 73,320

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Is the coup making a comeback in Africa? @FT.
Law & Politics


In Sudan, in April last year, after months of massive protests, the Sudanese military toppled the 30-year dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir. 

In 2017, a faction of Zimbabwe’s military ousted Robert Mugabe, who had ruled and misruled the former southern African breadbasket for 37 years.

This is not a return to the past. Before a wave of African democratisation in the 1990s, coups were as common as military dark glasses. 

In Zimbabwe, the spokesman for the generals who toppled Mugabe proclaimed on television: “We wish to make it absolutely clear that this is not a military takeover” — a statement somewhat undermined by the armoured vehicles on the streets.

That is a second feature of recent coups. They are popular, at least initially


Both Mugabe and Bashir were experts. Four years before he was dragged away in handcuffs, 94 per cent of Sudanese voters supposedly endorsed Bashir’s presidency.

Many of the continent’s “longest-serving” leaders, including Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni (34 years in power) and Cameroon’s Paul Biya (45 years and counting) have been periodically, if dubiously, endorsed at the ballot box. 

When democracy is so blatantly fixed, it becomes plausible for soldiers to seize power in the name of restoring — not rupturing — the democratic contract.

Recent coups come amid a strengthening of civil society. An increasingly urban, social-media savvy and politicised young population has come into conflict with often ageing leaders who cannot meet their aspirations.



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10 NOV 14 :: Ouagadougou's Signal to Sub-Sahara Africa
Law & Politics



Martin Aglo, a law student from Benin, told Reuters: “After the Arab Spring, this is the Black Spring”.

During the Arab Spring [now in the bleak mid-Winter], nearly all commentators spoke of how this North African wildfire could not leap the Sahara and head to sub-Saharan Africa. The reasons were that the State [incumbents] had a monopoly on the tools of violence and would bring overwhelming force and violence to bear.

We need to ask ourselves; how many people can incumbent shoot stone cold dead in such a situation – 100, 1,000, 10,000? This is another point: there is a threshold beyond which the incumbent can’t go. Where that threshold lies will be discovered in the throes of the event.

Therefore, the preeminent point to note is that protests in Burkina Faso achieved escape velocity. Overthrowing incumbents is all about acceleration, momentum and speed best characterised by the German word ‘Blitzkrieg’.

Out of a population of 17 million people in Burkina Faso, over 60 per cent are aged between 17 and 24 years, according to the World Bank, and this is another point to note. The country’s youth flexed their muscles. What’s clear is that a very young, very informed and very connected African youth demographic [many characterise this as a ‘demographic dividend’] – which for Beautiful Blaise turned into a demographic terminator – is set to alter the existing equilibrium between the rulers and the subjects, and a re-balancing has begun.

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Bondholders need to forgive some African sovereign debt @FinancialTimes
Africa

Africa looks particularly vulnerable as the coronavirus crisis continues to batter the global economy. 

The IMF forecasts sub-Saharan economies will shrink by 3.2 per cent this year — the continent’s first contraction in three decades — and that government budget deficits will reach 7.6 per cent of gross domestic product, also a record.

At the same time, the debt service burden of many African sovereigns has been surging. Scarce resources are diverted to interest and principal payments. 

Even so, some governments will simply not have the foreign exchange reserves to service their debts. 

The IMF concluded that the crisis will wipe out almost 10 years of progress in development.

Recognising those urgent challenges, G20 leaders agreed in April to allow some of the poorest countries to request suspension of their bilateral debt payments until the end of 2020.

A six-month moratorium on bilateral debt assumes two things: that the crisis is one of liquidity and will disappear by 2021, and that suspending bilateral debt service makes a meaningful difference.



Until about a decade ago, almost all financial liabilities of African sovereigns were with official creditors. 

According to data from rating agency S&P, 39 per cent is owed to private investors in 19 sub-Saharan sovereigns.

Since bonds carry higher coupons than the concessional interest on official debt, the share of commercial creditors in overall debt service is almost two-thirds. 

Most of that set of countries have foreign exchange reserves that are insufficient to cover even short-term external liabilities.

Nigeria, Ghana and Angola dedicate more than 40 per cent of government revenue to interest payments. Zambia and Kenya are not far behind. 

In 2014, all except Ghana showed ratios well below 20 per cent. The current level is not sustainable.

Africa’s slide into a new debt crisis should not surprise anyone. IMF data show that in every year since 2015, sub-Saharan Africa’s economies grew even more slowly than in 2009, the nadir of the financial crisis.

A high risk of default has been priced into African bonds. The warning signs have been clear for everyone to see.


The pandemic brought the day of reckoning forward. Bondholders now try to convince themselves, and others, that in the light of the unexpected external shock, they are doing their part by doing nothing. No new money, no relief.

They also argue that a restructuring of bonds would exclude African sovereigns from capital markets for many years. 

That is a self-serving argument and must be rejected. Investors have a history of lending to sovereigns after default. 

In June 2017 Argentina, a serial defaulter, sold a 100-year bond, only a year after the country had emerged from default.

Of course, Argentina has since defaulted again. In any case, sub-Saharan African sovereigns are shut out of the bond market already. No eurobonds have been sold since February.

Of course, Argentina has since defaulted again. In any case, sub-Saharan African sovereigns are shut out of the bond market already. No eurobonds have been sold since February.




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The Children's Place cancels millions of dollars of garment orders from Ethiopia @guardian
Retail & Manufacturing



The Children’s Place (TCP), which has more than 1,000 stores in the US and 90 around the world and had a turnover of $2bn (£1.5bn) last year, cancelled orders from Ethiopia in March and delayed payments by six months for orders completed in January and February, suppliers told the Guardian.

Ethiopian workers are the lowest paid in the global garment supply chain. 

According to a report by the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, the minimum wage for Ethiopian garment workers is $26 a month, compared with $95 in Bangladesh and $326 in China.

Ethiopian suppliers claim that TCP has demanded retroactive rebates on products that had been shipped before the crisis. 

They said the company cited the force majeure clause (which frees companies from contractual obligations in the case of certain extreme events) in its contracts as a reason not to pay, due to Covid-19.


In a statement, Gregory Poole, TCP’s chief supply chain officer, said the company had cancelled fewer than 3% of orders from Ethiopian suppliers.
One supplier told the Guardian his company had lost its credit line after losing nearly $1m because of contract cancellations.

“We are a company with 95% women workers. Some [of the workers are] mothers,” the supplier said. 

Asked what the company could do legally to recoup the hundreds of thousands of dollars lost, the supplier responded: “How do you fight such a big US corporation? They have endless pockets.”

Another supplier said that although TCP had started to pay back some money for the cancelled orders, the company still owed it hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The Children’s Place is one of four leading US apparel brands sourcing goods from Ethiopia, alongside PVH, JC Penney and H&M. 

In its annual report last year, TCP cited Ethiopia as a “key sourcing region”. 

The Worker Rights Consortium said at least seven factories in Ethiopia were producing clothing for TCP stores, employing about 15,000 workers.

In 2016, the Ethiopian government opened its flagship Hawassa Industrial Park to help boost Ethiopia’s economy through tax breaks for business and jobs for its growing population. 

Most of the country’s garment workers are young women who have migrated from poor rural areas.

But the pandemic has derailed the government’s plans. In April, the International Monetary Fund downgraded Ethiopia’s 2020 economic growth rate from 6.2% to 3.2%.

Aida*, 20, who has worked for a factory that produces clothing for TCP for three years, said her wages had been cut from $26 a month to $10 since March. 


 “In early April, as a result of the nationwide shutdown and the global uncertainty regarding the Covid-19 pandemic, we cancelled less than 3% of our Ethiopian orders. However, after working collaboratively with our vendor partners, we have mutually agreed to take in all finished orders, have increased our Ethiopian 2020 order volume by double digits, and are current on all of our Ethiopian vendor payments.

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A lesson unlearnt: Zambia on the path to Zimbabwe-like ruin @dailymaverick
Africa


For the record, Mboweni took to Twitter to say: “Presidents in Africa must stop this nonsense of waking up in the morning and fire a Central Bank Governor! You cannot do that. This is not some fiefdoms of yours! Your personal property?! No!”

He has since been reprimanded for going too far by South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa.


The bigger issue is that you can’t change the rules of arithmetic. 

Despite the example of neighbouring Zimbabwe’s economic collapse over the past 25 years, Lungu was apparently intent on his country relearning this maths lesson. 

And it will inevitably do so, at great economic and social cost, the responsibility for which Lungu’s government will habitually try to wriggle out of. 

Lungu needs a central bank governor who will not hesitate to print money.

Kalyalya, who holds a PhD from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) in the US, had warned of the “serious stress” that Zambia’s economy was under even before Covid-19 struck. 

“‘Last year we had a growth of 1.9%… that’s quite low,” he warned. 

Zambia was now experiencing “a recession… accompanied by inflation… a bad mix because the prices are rising which means that whatever little income you have is not going to go around.” 

This month Kalyalya projected a 4.2% contraction in GDP, down on the earlier forecast of -2.6%. 

He warned there was as a result a need to adjust macroeconomic fundamentals and debt sustainability to ensure economic stability. Credit to the private sector had nearly halved to 10.4% of GDP due to fears of high default rates. 

This would be the first Zambian recession in more than 20 years. But it has been some time in the making.

By the late 1980s, declining copper growth and the redistributive policies of Kenneth Kaunda’s one-party rule had resulted in declining national income and cyclical crises. 

With Kaunda’s bundling out of office on the return to multiparty politics in 1991, Zambia began a long path to recovery. 

Under this new regime, the privatisation of state companies saw copper outputs increase threefold to pre-nationalisation levels as fresh investment flowed in. 

Then arrived the Patriotic Front (PF) government of Michael Sata in 2011, succeeded on his death in 2014 by Lungu. 

The PF went on a foreign-debt-fuelled spending spree, the tally of which increased from under $500-million in 2005 to $11.7-billion today. 

Add in domestic debt and the figure is over $20-billion. 

Even before Covid, the PF was running out of other people’s money to spend. Yet the PF needs to continue to do so, not least given the upcoming 2021 national election.

To feed this habit, it needs to get rid of any obstacle to spending and printing more money.

As the dismissed governor intimates, now it is stuck in a bind between low growth, demand compression and declining copper production, the latter a reflection of governance and policy concerns. 

The upset caused by the abrogation of long-standing development agreements with the mines has been compounded by the subsequent failure to pay back VAT claims, the government’s squeezing of investors including Vedanta’s Konkola Copper Mine and Glencore’s Mopani, serial changes in tax and royalty regimes, and the understandable reluctance of the big companies to reinvest.

Throw in a power deficit of 940MW against a peak demand of 2,300MW with 8-10 hours of load shedding along with the threat of sovereign debt default, and Zambia is in a situation of radical uncertainty. 
Opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema says of Mvunga, “He does not have the depth of training, qualifications and experience in economics required to run the Zambia Central Bank. His integrity, credibility and personal character, is also questionable.”

He added: “With the IMF leaving us to sort out our own mess, the next likely group will be the creditors who will start demanding their pound of flesh. Then the kwacha will be in free fall.”

The causes of the economic situation not only remain unaddressed, but rather exacerbated by these developments: a lack of confidence engendered by poor choices of the sort that led to a change of governorship.

He argues that the reasons for Kalyalya’s dismissal centre on his refusal to print money for a PF spending spree prior to the 2021 national election, in which HH (as Hichilema is known) will again compete. 

Others are still more forthright.  

“He projects himself up as this big-time banker,” said one corporate figure of the new governor, “but he’s got no more financial acumen than the teller at my local branch.”

Mvunga worked as a product specialist at a bank in Zambia around the same time that Kalyalya acted as an executive director at the World Bank. 

Former finance minister (and Deputy Central Bank Governor) Situ Musokotwane says that South Africa has every right to comment on the governor’s removal. 

“‘Sovereignty is never absolute. One way or the other we are all linked together. SA is suffering from economic migrants caused by regional governments messing up, and it is within its rights thus to comment when another risks doing the same. 

“There is a high possibility of a runaway currency now,” he said. “This will translate into inflation and lengthening queues for scarce goods and services. Mvunga,” he warns, “will likely quickly deplete forex reserves to please Lungu in defending a falling exchange rate whose cause remains unaddressed by the same government. Yet solving this kind of problem requires fresh minds and a fresh approach.”



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“This crisis has however began to percolate to the counties. The new frontier of this invisible enemy is increasingly shifting to the counties and to our rural areas,” he said.
Kenyan Economy

“Even under COVID, our economy is growing at 4.6% compared to 5.5% at the same time last year,” he said without specifying the period he was referring to.

“The current economic indicators without doubt are lower- but definitely far better than we ever anticipated.”

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Absa Bank Kenya Plc reports HY 2020 Earnings
N.S.E Equities - Finance & Investment


Par Value:                  2/-
Closing Price:           9.90
Total Shares Issued:          5431536000.00
Market Capitalization:        53,772,206,400
EPS:             1.37
PE:                 7.226

Absa H1 2020 Earnings

HY Total Assets 391.878841b versus 353.836b

HY Loans and Advances [Net] to Customers 201.948138b versus 186.655058b

HY Total Operating Income 16.813506b versus 16.319118b

HY Loan Loss Provision 5.384951b versus 1.641335b

HY Total Operating Expenses [13.554039b] versus [10.045547b]

HY Profit Before Tax 1.592538b versus 5.712761b 

HY Profit After tAX 588.992M VERSUS 3.877714B

HY EPS 0.11 versus 0.71 



Provisions by @AbsaKenya increased due to COVID-19 and IFRS9 and from 1.6 billion in 2019 to 5.3 billion  @bankelele
.@Absabank has posted a Ksh 1.2 Billion Normalized Profit after Tax (PAT) for the half-year period ended June 30th 2020. @MaudhuiHouse
ABSA Bank Kenya Plc (NSE: ABSA) announced an 84.8% y/y decline in Profit after Tax (PAT) to KES 0.6Bn. 

The performance was primarily attributed to a 228.1% y/y (282.7% q/q) rise in Loan loss provision (LLP) to KES 5.4Bn 

The gross non-performing loans (NPLs) rose 8.4% y/y (-1.9% q/q) to KES 17.0Bn 

a big chunk of the provisioning being undertaken on the performing book, on the back of the economic outlook.

The bank has restructured KES 57.0Bn worth of loans, representing 28.2% of the loan book. 

56.0% of the KES 17.0Bn NPL book was attributed to the corporate space, primarily originating from Manufacturing (KES 5.8Bn), Real Estate & Construction (KES 1.5Bn) and Trade (KES 1.4Bn).

 

Conclusions 

Threw the Kitchen sink into these results which is commendable. 


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Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd.reports H1 2020 Earnings
N.S.E Equities - Finance & Investment


Par Value:                  5/-

Closing Price:           219.75

Total Shares Issued:          72472950.00

Market Capitalization:        15,925,930,763

EPS:             49.07

PE:                 4.478

HY Earnings 2020

HY Gross Written Premium 20.225097b versus 20.713789b

HY Net Insurance Premium 10.149984b versus 9.566028b

HY Other Revenue 3.802522b versus 4.067355b

HY Total Income 13.952506b versus 13.633383b

Net Insurance Benefits and Claims [8.6117816b] versus [9.0058216b]

HY Group Profit before Tax 2.376788b versus 2.267399b

HY Net Profit 1.830475b versus 1.8314136b

HY EPS 21.94 versus 21.72

Interim dividend 1/=

Conclusions 

Resilient 

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Kenya Airways reports H1 2020 Earnings
N.S.E Equities - Commercial & Services

Par Value:                  5/-

Closing Price:           3.83

Total Shares Issued:          5681616931.00

Market Capitalization:        21,760,592,846

EPS:             -2.23

PE:                 -1.717

  

Kenya Airways reports H1 2020 Earnings 

HY Total Income 30.214b versus 58.55b -48%

HY Operating Costs [38.631b] versus [61.454b]

HY Operating Loss [8.417b] versus [2.904b]

HY Other Costs [5.975b] versus [5.684b]

HY Loss before Income Tax [14.355b] versus [8.562b]

HY Loss for the Period [14.326b] versus [8.563b]

HY Total comprehensive Loss [21.017b] versus [8.059b]

HY EPS [2.46] versus [1.47]

HY Total Equity [38.913b] versus [17.896b]

-55.5% reduction in passenger numbers 

Conclusions

It is no longer strictly speaking a Going Concern. 

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Bamburi Cement reports HY 2020 Earnings
N.S.E Equities - Industrial & Allied


Par Value:                  5/-

Closing Price:           21.30

Total Shares Issued:          362959275.00

Market Capitalization:        7,731,032,558

EPS:             1.74

PE:                 12.241

  

HY results 2020

HY Turnover 16.228b versus 18.663b

HY Operating Costs [16.6b] versus [18.331b]

HY Operating Profit 228m versus 332m

HY Profit before Tax 213m versus 23m

HY Taxation 508m versus 370m

HY Profit after Tax 721m versus 393m

HY EPS 1.84 versus 1.61 

No Interim Dividend

Company Commentary

Since beginning of pandemic gradual decline in activity in building and construction industry driven by construction site closures

Conclusions 

This share price has crashed and burned. 

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BOC Kenya reports H1 2020 Earnings
N.S.E Equities - Industrial & Allied


Par Value:                  5/-

Closing Price:           57.50

Total Shares Issued:          19525446.00

Market Capitalization:        1,122,713,145

EPS:             2.86

PE:                 20.105

  

BOC Kenya reports H1 2020 Earnings

HY Revenue 442.569m versus 495.166m

HY Profit before tax 28.233m versus 33.583m

HY Profit After Tax 14.574m versus 19.024m

HY EPS 0.75 versus 0.97 

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by Aly Khan Satchu (www.rich.co.ke)
 
 
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August 2020
 
 
 
 
 
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