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Wednesday 25th of September 2019 |
27-NOV-2017 :: Bitcoin "Wow! What a Ride!" Africa |
This, you will agree, is mind-boggling inflation. In my experience, when I have found myself riding a tiger by its tail, the key issue is the getting off
Or as T.S Eliot said in The Hollow Men
Between the idea And the reality Between the motion And the act Falls the Shadow For Thine is the Kingdom.
“Life should not be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in a pretty and well preserved body, but rather to skid in broadside in a cloud of smoke, thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and loudly proclaiming “Wow! What a Ride!”
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Ozymandias PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY Africa |
I met a traveller from an antique land, Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand, Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown, And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command, Tell that its sculptor well those passions read Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed; And on the pedestal, these words appear: My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings; Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair! Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away.”
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'The Flower That Smiles Today' Africa |
The flower that smiles to-day To-morrow dies; All that we wish to stay Tempts and then flies. What is this world’s delight? Lightning that mocks the night, Brief even as bright.
Virtue, how frail it is! Friendship how rare! Love, how it sells poor bliss For proud despair! But we, though soon they fall, Survive their joy, and all Which ours we call.
Whilst skies are blue and bright, Whilst flowers are gay, Whilst eyes that change ere night Make glad the day; Whilst yet the calm hours creep, Dream thou—and from thy sleep Then wake to weep.
Political Reflections
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PETER HALL STAGES A LONDON 'ORESTEIA' [which is precisely the version to which I am referring] Law & Politics |
When Peter Hall, director of Britain's National Theatre, first glimpsed its new Olivier auditorium, which is designed to resemble an ancient Greek amphitheater, an idea long cooking in his head came bursting to the surface. At last he would have the opportunity to stage ''The Oresteia,'' and in a space not dissimilar to the one Aeschylus actually used when the trilogy won him the annual Dionysian playwriting competition back in March 458 B.C. Thus the production Mr. Hall has just unveiled there is a major project for him and, judging by the journalistic interest it has generated in England, a matter of some importance to theater audiences, too. Would it work? Could it work, given the presence of an all-male cast wearing full-length masks throughout, not to mention the forbidding subject-matter of the three plays themselves? Recall how, long ago, Agamemnon's father, Atreus, threw one of those unorthodox supper parties so popular in mythic times, inviting along his brother Thyestes and serving him his two eldest sons as a main course. Later, Agamemnon himself sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia in order to guarantee favorable winds for the Greek fleet leaving to fight the Trojan War. These actions produce their inevitable reactions. On his triumphant return home, Agamemnon is killed in retaliation for Iphigenia's death by his wife Clytemnestra, aided by her lover Aegisthus, whose gripe is that he's the third son of the wronged Thyestes. So ends the trilogy's first component, ''The Agamemnon.'' The other two plays involve the particular predicament of Agamemnon's son Orestes, caught in one of those dilemmas with which the Greek deities relished tormenting their victims. In order to fulfil his great obligation as the avenger of patricide, and avoid the agonies Apollo promisers him if he fails, he must commit the great crime of matricide. Accordingly, he kills Clytemnestra and ends up in Athens, defendant in a murder trial whose implications are sufficiently weighty to attract some very senior legal talent. The Furies prosecute, Apollo defends, and the goddess Athena presides over a jury of freeborn citizens whose six-six split vote ensures Orestes' acquittal. Thus the divinely sanctioned democracy of Athens plays its part in solving the Oresteian knot, a matter of obvious satisfaction to Aeschylus but possibly of less moment to us nowadays. Could we really take more than academic interest in a 2,550-year-old saga rawly describing the feuds of men and gods and piously celebrating the moral and political supremacy of an antique city? As it turned out, the answers to these questions were various. Mr. Hall's production, played in front of steel walls as vast, brooding and inflexible as the fate they presumably symbolize, is often stunning to look at. When the red-robed, black-haired, shiny-faced Clytemnestra looms like some implacable Eqyptian priestess over the corpse of the husband she's just stabbed to death; when Orestes and Electra, frail, pale figures kneeling hand in hand, implore their father's ghost to rise from the grave, accompanied by the increasingly urgent cries of a gray, baleful chorus of Trojan slaves; when the avenging Furies, wearing their coven uniform of black tatters, white faces and stringy orange hair, weave and swirl and sway across the stage, menacing the mesmerized Orestes: at such times one feels ready for 10 hours os Aeschylus, instead of the five-and-a-half the trilogy actually runs. Harrison Birtwistle's music, its plunks, bangs and sudden, alarming shrieks adding greatly to the tension and atmosphere, proves an unequivocal success; Jocelyn Herbert's masks, a more equivocal one. But it's surely wrong to see the trilogy too exclusively as concerning a turning-point in the great sexual struggle. It is, after all, also about other and more welcome examples of human evolution: spiritual, moral, social, political, judicial. 'The Oresteia'' shows man struggling from chaos to civilization. It describes the breakdown of the old, private system of correcting wrongs and the discovery of a new, public means of ensuring that right prevails. It involves the attempt to reconcile law with justice, mercy with fear, reason with instinct, the claims of the divine with those of the human. In other words, it concerns tensions still with us, has dated more in externals than in essence, and was as well worth reviving as Peter Hall believed. And that, of course, is unfortunate as well as fortunate. Brave and imaginative though his production undoubtedly is, it hardly has the size, scope and force ''The Oresteia'' demands.
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05-AUG-2019 :: "What's your road, man?" Law & Politics |
’ What’s your road, man? - holy- boy road, madman road, rainbow road, guppy road, any road. It’s an anywhere road for anybody anyhow. Where body how?” - The Key question is this. Can Prime Minister Johnson self-eject Britain? Can he be stopped? This is a political calculation.
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Opinion What Saudi Arabia's MBS and @WeWork's Adam Neumann Have in Common @haaretzcom Commodities |
Let’s compare Adam Neumann and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In less than nine years Neumann built WeWork into a shared office space giant and virtually created a new industry by dint of a charismatic personality and business vision. But when it came time for WeWork’s initial public offering, everything fell apart. It turns out that vision and the ability to inspire isn’t enough when the numbers don’t add up and your company’s business’ prospects are uncertain. The crown prince has a degree of charisma and a vision outlined in exquisite Power Point detail called “Vision 2030,” just in case readers were to mistake it for Pipedream Whenever. But when it comes to making sure that floating Aramco, the kingdom’s giant oil company, will be a success, he also has the help of the state security services. As part of the IPO now getting underway, according to the Financial Times, the crown prince is forcing the country’s wealthiest families to buy into it, to ensure its success. The FT uses terms like “strong-arm,” “coerce” and “bully” to describe the tactics. Remember that many of these same families know pressure from the crown price very well. Two years ago, some 300 of them were forcibly detained in Riyadh’s Ritz Carlton Hotel until they ponied up what Saudi authorities say was $100 billion in ill-gotten gains. The IPO pressure isn’t quite so dire, but it is shaping up into the offering you can’t refuse. Does the prince see any irony in this? The Aramco offering is supposed to raise tens of billions of dollars in capital that the kingdom will use to transform itself from a petro-state to a diverse economy of high-tech and tourism. The key to this is building a free market and a dynamic business sector, but it’s not getting off to a good start if the government employs techniques out of The Godfather to do it. Prince Mohammed is not only reiterating the big and ugly message he sent during the Ritz Carlton affair, that business must bow to royal priorities at all costs. He is also conveying a silent but important message that the Aramco IPO isn’t a good investment, certainly not at the stunning $2 trillion valuation the crown is reportedly aiming for. The crown prince's vision thing isn’t working. The Aramco IPO, if you recall, was originally supposed to be a monster sale of 5% of the company’s shares in a major overseas market. It would have raised $100 billion and dwarfed the biggest IPO to date ($25 billion by China’s Alibaba in 2014). It was called off in August 2018 because investors thought Aramco wasn’t worth that and because of their doubts about its independence from the Saudi government, among others. Since then, Aramco’s facilities have come under repeated attacks, the worst being the drone strikes earlier this month that knocked out half of its production. That alone should have been enough to push IPO plans into the distant future, but the crown price began dusting them off this summer and shortly after the latest attack - named the banks that will manage it. This time around it’s a much smaller affair: The plan is to sell just a 1% stake this year and another 1% in 2020 for trading on the local stock exchange (Tadawul). More may come later, but for now Aramco won’t be trading in New York or London and it may raise a mere $15 billion-$30 billion. The failure isn’t confined to Aramco. Transformations like the kind the crown prince is trying to engineer in Saudi Arabia take time, but there’s little evidence he’s making much progress. The latest estimates from the International Monetary Fund show that the kingdom’s non-oil economy -- the one that is supposed to take off under Vision 2030 -- growing by a not particularly impressive 2.9% this year. More Saudis are entering the workforce, but the pace is not commensurate with the rate at which the kingdom is forcing out the guest workers who keep the economy going. The jobless rate for Saudis has if anything been rising since Vision 2030 kicked off, and passed 12% in the second quarter. The percentage of Saudis holding down jobs is still low, especially for women. Vision 2030 is too ambitious, even if Prince Mohammed could raise the capital to finance it. Saudis don’t have the skills to build a Startup Nation economy. Also, the prince may aspire to a capitalist economy but if anything, government has gotten bigger under his stewardship, with a widening role for its sovereign wealth fund. New-business formation is stagnant and older small businesses are closing, in part because lower-cost guest workers are leaving and hiring Saudis is too expensive. The crown price’s goal of making Saudi Arabia one of the Top 5 world tourism destinations inside a decade is crazy. He would have to build a $100 billion industry from scratch in that time - in a country that doesn’t even issue tourist visas yet, bans alcohol and bikinis, and is unbearably hot a good part of the year. (And will get even more unbearably hot, according to climate change forecasts - but it denies such reports anyway.) The crown prince is right that Saudi Arabia has no future as a petro-state, but he’s wrong in thinking he can buy himself the economy he wants. Money isn’t the obstacle. The problem is the absence of the rule of law, basic freedoms, transparency and a modicum of democracy. The Aramco IPO should serve as a case study in Economics 101 about how not to do it.
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Breaking an electoral suicide pact @EthiopiaInsight Africa |
In early August, the EPRDF Executive Committee announced that national elections will go ahead as scheduled next year. This means Ethiopia is about to enter a highly charged competition for power, with polling day perhaps less than nine months away. Is this a wise move, or foolish bravado? Less than two years ago, Ethiopia was on the brink of implosion. It arguably escaped this fate due to the reformist wing of EPRDF, dubbed Team Lemma, making demands of protesters their own and taking power via an alliance of the Oromo and Amhara parties. Subsequently, Ethiopia entered a new era, as abuses of the past were corrected. But optimism quickly dissipated, and a new phase of bitter political contest began. Groups previously classed “terrorist organizations” like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot 7 returned and new parties such as the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) emerged. Political manoeuvring became more assertive, and, in some cases, extremist, as in Amhara with Asaminew Tsige and elements with ties to the OLF. Some of these groups, such as OLF and NaMA, have irreconcilable agendas. There is no consensus on many issues, including, critically, the legitimacy of the 1995 constitution and the ethnic federal structure. Old debates—over regional boundaries, national languages, and identity—have re-emerged with vengeance. New aspirations revitalized long-simmering challenges. Making the situation particularly grave is the recent history. After waves of protests and lethal state repression since 2014, Ethiopia more resembles a country that just emerged from civil war than a healthy democracy. Despite last year’s opening of the political space, the country only seemed to sink deeper into a quagmire. While the same coalition remains in power, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration differs from the former hardline EPRDF, particularly in its liberal disposition and in terms of where power resides. For the first time in Ethiopia’s history, central power stems from Oromia. This is revolutionary indeed. Yet, despite this change, the old EPRDF is not dead yet. The coalition remains a self-declared vanguard, pursuing revolutionary democracy via authoritarian practices. Compromise with opposition forces is antithetical to this approach. This has major implications for how the country moves forward, not least regarding elections. Even though Ethiopia held polls every five years since 1995, only one was competitive. Elections therefore have a vital dual role in marking a potential transition to competitive democracy and also a move from partly violent to overwhelmingly peaceful political contest. The question is whether the current fragility—characterized by elevated social mistrust, weak democratic institutions, disorganized opposition parties, and regional insecurities—should be exposed to the pressure cooker of an election. For people to be empowered, polls must be held. But elections are not necessarily appropriate for resolving fundamental differences. Lencho Leta, a respected Oromo opposition veteran, has stated, “forging a democratic political order would fail as long as absolutist positions continue to confront each other”. Rushed elections are not the way to build a consensus on whether, for example, Ethiopia should have ethnic or non-ethnic federalism. Given volatile polarized pluralism, an election will produce winners and losers, may well increase divergence, and could lead to conflict. Undoubtedly, polls can stabilize a fragile state, but that does not mean holding them as soon as possible is desirable. The experiences of countries including Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt and Nepal, show that the timing of a post-conflict election is a decisive factor in determining whether peace or conflict prevails. One major negative consequence of an untimely election is that it increases the probability that one or more parties will reject unfavorable results. Ethiopia has yet to pass the acid test of democracy Benjamin Reilly in Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios: Constraints and Dangers identifies three major factors that influence elections held in fragile countries: timing; the governance of elections; and the type of parties, whether they are, for example, personalized or ethnic-based. According to Reilly, “ill-timed, badly designed or poorly run election can actually undermine the broader process of democratization.” Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder agreed in Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections, as they argue, “…elections held soon after wars end, when political institutions remain weak, are associated with an increased likelihood of a return to violence.” And, writing in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Alon Ben-Meir, similarly opined that, “premature elections could usher in a period of continued political instability punctuated by violence, or introduce new totalitarian regimes that would assume power under the pretext of maintaining order and stability.” Ethiopia does not have a political culture characterized by democratic elections and transitions, and nor does it have the requisite strong institutions, including a capable independent judiciary. The country also has yet to pass what Merera Gudina, chair of the Oromo Federalist Congress, once called the acid test of multiparty democracy––the peaceful transfer of power from one party to another. In the long durée, if we consider the Abyssinian polity prior to the formation of the modern Ethiopian state, conflicts during transitions were often severe. In the modern era, the open 2005 election led to a contested outcome and violence that claimed around 200 lives. Arguably, what awaits following an election next year may pale by comparison. Fifteen years before, the ruling party refused to concede defeat, leading to a more authoritarian grip on power. The forthcoming elections, if held too soon, could deepen divisions and harden extreme views, leading to a total breakdown in order. Another factor that should be considered is the nature of the opposition. For example, OLF has been engaged in armed struggle for self-determination of the Oromo people for decades. It is less than a year now since its leadership joined the political process. In such a short period, it is difficult to transform from liberation front to political party, especially when, with an electoral board and electoral rules in flux, it has not yet been registered. The fact there are still OLF-linked elements who have not adopted peaceful struggle, and whose relationship with OLF is not clear, suggests that it is not yet a cohesive democratic party. This complicates the situation in Oromia, where it would compete with the Prime Minister’s ODP. A number of other former rebel organizations recently entered peaceful politics, including an OLF faction led by Abba Naga Jaarra, as well as the Oromo National Party headed by General Kemal Galchu. In Somali region, the Ogaden National Liberation Front is also trying to transform itself into a contending party. Come election time, will former rebels eschew violence as a means to an end? Are these organizations ready to compromise and abide by the rules? The proliferation of parties, to around 140 currently, also presents a challenge. Conducting an election before consolidation prevents fusion among similarly minded organizations. The plethora of parties confuses the electorate, making it difficult to reach consensus on major issues and effectively challenge EPRDF. The constitution requires a national census to be conducted every ten years, not least because an accurate electoral register requires reliable demographic data. However, parliamentarians decided in June to again postpone the count for one more year, due to organizational challenges linked to political and environmental insecurity It is risky for a government that is not able to conduct a census to push ahead with an election, which requires more intensive preparation and has potentially much more serious consequences. The elephant in the room, however, is prevailing instability, perhaps the most significant hurdle for peaceful elections next year. Security remains poor in districts including West Wollega and Guji in Oromia, the entire Southern Nations, and some areas in Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara. Operations to resettle internally displacement persons are still ongoing in locations where recent conflicts have supposedly died down. These areas are either outside the effective control of the government or under de facto states of emergency. Even if such hot spots could be pacified swiftly, it is doubtful a fair and accurate poll could be held in areas recently under military control, as freedom of expression, association, and assembly may not have existed for sufficient time prior to polling. If any major party does not graciously concede an election this would represent a major blow to the reboot of democracy in Ethiopia. But it does not end there—a challenge to the election result could quickly descend into violence. This would be dire in Ethiopia, where acute ethnic rifts are rife, and a weakened state security apparatus is already stretched. Under current conditions, an unwillingness of some of the many parties to accept defeat looms large. Academics such as Reilly believe that a major factor leading to parties not conceding is fear that a change of power could lead to fundamental shifts in state policy. In Ethiopia, there are huge differences on key issues, including over the type of governing system, and who runs the capital. Even on symbolic matters, such as what the flag should be and who the nation’s historical heroes are, there is little consensus. Moreover, political power is tied to material interests. Not only political appointees, but the overwhelming majority of senior civil servants, and even lower bureaucrats and kebele administrators, are ruling party loyalists. In a country where the state is the biggest employer, one can imagine that losing such positions would threaten not only many livelihoods, but also the social power base of the ruling party. This enhances the possibility that EPRDF may not simply accept defeat. This problem is not confined to the ruling party. Opposition parties may also not want to concede. A sense of entitlement exists among groups that have fought the EPRDF regime for many years. As a result of their sacrifice, organizations like OLF expect power, at least in their western Oromia stronghold, as do Ezema, the closest to a successor to CUD from 2005, in urban areas. There is also fear that if defeated they may be out of contention for power for many years to come. The OLF leadership may well believe that because EPRDF is currently weakened, early elections are an opportune moment to remove it from its perch. Recent history suggests that EPRDF may strive to hold onto power. Trust in the incumbent, as well as some returning parties, remains shaky. A thorough confidence-building process and a legally binding agreement between all stakeholders should therefore be organized to agree ground rules. The recent political parties’ code of conduct does not appear adequate, as it is neither sufficiently inclusive nor comprehensive. Ethiopia is a country where genuine sharing of power has seldom occurred. What would happen, for instance, if OLF wins a regional majority in Oromia, while EPRDF takes the federal parliament? The handling of these types of risky scenarios must be discussed. The situation is further complicated by the fact that EPRDF itself is fragmented. Recent acrimony between the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) is a case in point. But such internal hostilities are not limited to those souring relations. TPLF recently accused the Prime Minister of eroding the constitutional order and vowed it would not let the country descend into anarchy. How can we hope for the electoral board to conduct an exceptionally democratic election in a country where such a divided ruling coalition exists, and is still deeply entangled with the state apparatus? EPRDF fragility does not end here, as there is also the issue of power-sharing between constituent parties. For example, currently, TPLF, which represents a region of six million people, has an equal number of representatives in party committees as ODP, which represents 34 million people. This imbalance has been long-questioned and is still subject to debate. Abiy’s answer appears to be for EPRDF parties and their affiliates to merge into one organization, but there is little time for this, and some parties, or faction within parties, may balk at such radical reform. The more important question, though, relates to the party–state relationship. EPRDF remains entwined with the state. Would it continue utilizing the bureaucracy and government media for campaigning? Political organizations should come up with a detailed plan and agreement which would allow them to build trust in each other and level the playing field. If they do not, the fairness of the outcome may well be questioned. This election is occurring without any change from the first-past-the post, which enabled the mono-party system in the first place. It does not seem that this ‘winner takes all’ approach is suitable for Ethiopia. Instead, as suggested back in 2016 by the president, some proportional representation would help to ensure opposition representation. Or perhaps a consociational model should be introduced to enable consensual power-sharing at the national level. Right now, there is just not enough time to engage in such important discussions before polling day. The upcoming election is critical, and instead of rushing it, the key is to institute an electoral system suited to Ethiopia’s federal context. The push to hold post-conflict elections soon usually comes from the incumbent, as it wants to hold them before competitors can adequately prepare. The Ethiopian case is no exception. The EPRDF leadership, despite its divisions, is well aware that the opposition is divided and that it is better organized. But opposition parties may reject the outcome if EPRDF claims an overwhelming majority, as in 2010 and 2015. In many ways, we have reached a stage where it has become difficult to talk about EPRDF as a solid coalition. And on this issue, TPLF pushed the other parties hard to maintain the election schedule. This is probably because Tigray is relatively peaceful, the party does not want to give its regional opponents time and space, and postponing the election would be major affront to a constitution that TPLF considers itself the primary guardian of. To be fair, there are valid self-interested reasons why EPRDF might want to hold elections as scheduled. Restoring legitimacy is a primary concern. The protests since 2014 and major reshuffles in government since 2018 eroded EPRDF’s legitimacy further. Its functionaries therefore want to reestablish it as soon as possible. Rescheduling elections may also send a negative impression to the international community that the country is fragile, or backsliding to authoritarianism. The government may argue that this may harm the country’s image and have a significant impact on foreign investment. Moreover, there are legal hurdles to postponing, as the constitution provides no clear guidance on the procedure. From among the main contenders, the ONLF and OLF have the same stance, despite not being registered. OLF seems convinced that it has good prospects of winning in Oromia if elections are held soon. The leadership is very likely to believe that OLF has the largest number of followers in the region, and it also counts on the legitimacy deficit of ODP due to its past practices. But under Team Lemma, ODP is also confident, meaning one party is in for a rude awakening. In developed democracies that have gone through many electoral cycles, opposition parties are not enemies of the incumbent, but responsible participants that may form the next government. In this case, all actors should remember that Ethiopia has rarely had a peaceful transition of power, let alone following a vote. Key to a peaceful election is trust between major political organizations; and time is needed to build that trust. There are deep-seated divisions amongst ethnic groups, and with its politically active young population, Ethiopia is a highly complex country to govern. That said, in spite of everything, the nation could be on the cusp of something great. If reforms are carefully handled, it has a bright future of transforming into a more democratic society. But if it is not handled carefully, it could prove to have been on the cusp of an abyss. The country’s reformed political leadership and newly forming opposition should consider agreeing a longer road-map to elections—perhaps looking west to Sudan for inspiration—which provides the necessary time for wide-ranging discussions and institutional reforms. This could lay the foundations for free, fair, and peaceful polls. After all, elections are not to be toyed with—and nor should they be a suicide pact.
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02-JUL-2018 :: Ethiopia Rising. @TheStarKenya Africa |
Abiy Ahmed Ali (Amharic: , Or omo: Abiyyi Ahimad Alii; born 15 August 1976) was appointed the 12th Prime Minister of Ethiopia on 2 April 2018. He grew up in a Muslim family (Ahmed Ali, his Oromo father; Tezeta Wolde, his mother) and with Oromo Muslim and Christian grandparents. He is evidently a Virilian and Gladwellian Figure. “To create one contagious movement, you often have to create many small movements first.” “Look at the world around you. It may seem like an immovable, implacable place. It is not, With the slightest push—in just the right place—it can be tipped.”—Malcolm Gladwell . He has been Prime Minster for 90 days. During those 90 days, he has criss-crossed the country, ended a state of emergency, released thousands of political prisoners, thawed relations with Eritrea [29 Mar 2018 HE Abiy Ahmed @PM_AbiyAhmed - It is time. Lets build a wall of love between #Ethiopia & #Eritrea], bagged a $1b from the UAE, announced a dramatic economic about-turn. In matters language and linguistics, he has tapped into a ‘’Nelson Mandela’’ 1994 mood. These 90 or so days represent the most consequential arrival of an African politician on the African stage since Mandela walked out of prison blinking in the sunlight and constructed his ‘’rainbow nation’’. I recalled watching the Whirling Dervishes of the Mevlevi order on a night of a full moon in Konya, Turkey. I thought what they all have in common with Abiy Ahmed. It’s all about speed and velocity. Paul Virilio terms it ‘dromology’, which he defined as the “science (or logic) of speed“. He notes that the speed at which something happens may change its essential nature, and that which moves with speed quickly comes to dominate that which is slower. “Whoever controls the territory possesses it. Possession of territory is not primarily about laws and contracts, but first and foremost a matter of movement and circulation.” Virilio argues that the traditional feudal fortified city disappeared because of the increasing sophistication of weapons and possibilities for warfare. For Virilio, the concept of siege warfare became rather a war of movement. Abiy Ahmed has moved at lightning speed, the old guard is like ‘’the traditional feudal fortified city’’. He said “The ppl of Tigray are still begging for a drop of water; TPLF (the party) is not the people of Tigray”. On the same day he said, “we are in debt, we have to pay back but we can’t. And secondarily, we aren’t able to finish projects we have started” and announced his economic Pivot. Of course, the downside risk of all this infrastructure is plain to see and Sri Lanka and the tale of its Hambantota Port is now a cautionary Tale. FX reserves were at less than a month’s worth of imports and something needed to be done. Expectations are high. The Prime Minister needs to execute real quick on the economic front Abiy Ahmed’s first 90 days have been as remarka- ble as the less than 90 minutes of France’s Mbappe’s performance on Saturday.
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Zimbabwe Black Market Gap Vanishes After Central Bank Intervenes @markets Africa |
The gap between Zimbabwe’s black market and official currency rates vanished after the central bank tightened regulations on trade in foreign exchange by bureau de change operators. On Monday, black market rates for the Zimbabwe dollar ranged from 14.7 to 15 to the U.S. dollar, according to Marketwatch.co.zw., a site run by financial analysts. The official rate was at a record low of 14.91, according to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The central bank said on Sept. 21 that bureau de change rates would need to be within 7% of the official rate after they slumped to as low as 23 to the U.S. dollar.
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S.Africa rides investor demand to raise $5 bln from bonds sale @ReutersAfrica Africa |
The South African government said on Tuesday it raised $5 billion from the sale of two new bonds in international markets, as strong demand from investors helped it raise 25% more than it had originally planned. The transaction was more than twice oversubscribed with interest from insurance and pension funds, financial institutions, hedge funds and others from across nearly all continents. Only one of the top three ratings firms, Moody’s, ranks Pretoria’s debt at investment grade, while Fitch and S&P Global Ratings have the country’s sovereign debt on junk status. “The South African government sees the success of the transaction, believed to be the largest ever out of Sub-Saharan Africa, as an expression of investor confidence in the country’s sound macro-economic policy framework and prudent fiscal management,” The National Treasury said in a statement. Africa’s most developed economy was able to pre-fund an additional $1 billion over the $4 billion it had originally planned to raise, according to the statement. The country recorded better-than-expected growth of 3.1% in the second quarter following a deep first quarter contraction, but analysts fear maintaining growth at that level is unlikely. The treasury said it sold the bonds on Sept. 23 in two tranches, raising $2 billion from 10-year notes with a 4.85% coupon and $3 billion from 30-year notes with 5.75% coupon. Citi, Deutsche Bank/Nedbank consortium, Rand Merchant Bank, and Standard Bank were joint bookrunners on the deal.
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Traffic Jams in Kenya's Capital Bleed $1 Billion From Economy @economics Africa |
Cars and minibuses stuck in grinding traffic cause many a missed meeting in Kenya’s capital, potentially costing East Africa’s largest economy almost $1 billion a year in lost productivity. That’s according to the Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority, which ranked Nairobi as the world’s fourth most congested city. In a new report, it put the average travel time in the city -- home to 3.2 million people -- at 57 minutes, and recommended a Bus Rapid Transit System for five key routes to stem the gridlock.
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KCB Group Takes over Mumias Sugar The Trading Room Africa |
Kenya Commercial Bank Group Plc has today taken over Mumias Sugar Company over default in loans and appointed Ponangipalli VenkataRamana Rao as the company’s receiver manager to run the beleaguered miller. Mumias has defaulted on loan repayments from its lenders and has not paid any dividends for 8 years. In a letter dated September 20, 2019, KCB Group has instructed the receiver to use all receivership powers as issued in the KCB Debentures agreements and in the laws of Kenya to recover defaulted Mumias payments in full. Mumias becomes the third listed company to be placed under receivership after Besieged Cement Manufacturing ARM & Retailer Deacons E.A Plc.
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